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PREFACE* 
At the sixteenth session of ECLA, held in Port of Spain in 
May 1975, the ECLA secretariat informed the member 
Governments of the Commission of its concern over the 
recent evolution of the international economic situation and 
its immediate and longer-term prospects. The Governments, 
for their part, unanimously adopted resolution 348(XVI) 
which recommends the secretariat to convene a meeting of a 
group of experts to prepare a report on possible solutions to. 
the problems of the present situation. 
The acute economic recession, the high level of 
unemployment and the sharp inflation being experienced by 
the main economies with which Latin America is linked are 
now being reflected in the economic development of the 
region and its balance-of-payments behaviour in such a 
manner as to cause concern in the great majority of Latin 
American countries. The prices of many commodities have 
gone down and are continuing to sink. Exports of 
manufactures are running into increasing competition and 
restrictions on access to markets. The prices of imports are 
rising rapidly. At the same time, the flows of financial 
resources to the developing world are not increasing as 
"The text presented in this publication is the result of the 
discussions of a group of experts convened by the ECLA secretariat in 
accordance with resolution 348(xvi) of the Commission. 
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expected, and furthermore the majority of the Latin 
American countries are tending to be left out more and more 
often from international financial co-operation. The 
restrictions on the external sector of the Latin American 
economy are seriously threatening the possibilities of 
maintaining the growth rates of the product achieved in 
recent years: moreover, a number of the non-oil-exporting 
countries of the region have been obliged to contract short-
term debts on extremely unfavourable terms, thus 
jeopardizing their future development. 
Instability and recurrent balance-of-payments crises 
seem to be the dominant signs under which the region will 
have to live in the coming years. Development policies will be 
affected by this, and the active mobilization of Latin 
America to deal with the problem becomes more urgent than 
ever. 
If recent trends persist, the balance-of-payments deficit 
on current account of the non-oil-exporting countries of the 
region, which more than trebled between 1973 and 1974 to a 
figure of 13 000 million dollars in the latter year, will 
continue to grow in 1975 and 1976 if any attempt is made to 
keep up economic development rates in line with those fixed 
as targets by the countries. 
Praiseworthy efforts are being made internationally to 
find a solution to the balance-of-payments problems of the 
developing countries, while the developed countries are 
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themselves endeavouring to solve their own problems by 
setting up defence and security mechanisms like the 
collective safety net recently approved by the OECD 
countries. A fact must, however, be stressed. All the 
solutions which are being arranged and discussed give special 
preference —and this is quite justified— to the least developed 
countries or those most seriously affected by balance-of-
payments problems. This practice almost entirely excludes 
the countries of the region, which have achieved higher levels 
of income and thus form part of a veritable "middle class" of 
nations. No thought is given to adequate solutions for 
countries like ours, nor to the fact that the situation differs 
considerably from country to country within the region. 
These relative situations mean that the impact of the 
international economic situation is quite uneven and 
noticeably different according to the relative strength of each 
country or the nature of its external trade. 
Some laudable efforts are being orchestrated at the 
regional level; these include the substantial increase in 
resources approved by the recent Assembly of Governors of 
IDB, the agreements between central banks already reached 
in discussions at the sub-regional level, the possible creation 
of a bank for the promotion of exports, and others. Such 
action is, however, obviously inadequate. The absence of 
suitable solutions for Latin America at the world level and 
the severity with which the international economic situation 
is affecting the region are forcing the political bodies to 
immediate action. 
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With the idea of initiating a discussion on the particular 
balance-of-payments problems experienced by Latin America 
and finding adequate solutions to them, the ECLA secretariat 
has considered it necessary to think in terms of a new effort 
towards Latin American solidarity and at the same time a 
new form of relations with the developed countries with 
which the region maintains close trade and financial ties. 
In connexion with the first point, it is worth noting t.hat 
the region has a long history of mobilizing the spirit of 
regional co-operation and awakening solidarity among the 
countries of the region when faced with difficulties of a 
collective nature. The interest of the central countries in a 
new type of dialogue stems from the importance of the 
sustained progress of the Latin American economy for the 
economies of the industrial world today. The region is now 
an active factor and not merely a passive spectator of world 
economic development. The "critical mass" of the output 
achieved by the region in recent years, amounting to 220 
thousand million dollars —equivalent in real terms to the 
output of Western Europe in 1950— requires a total volume 
of imports of 40 000 million dollars. This makes Latin 
America, for each of the developed economies, a purchaser of1 
comparable importance to the other industrial economies. 
In view of the foregoing, the idea of a collective safety 
net to cope with balance-of-payments fluctuations, as 
outlined here, stems from a truly Latin American basic 
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effort, with co-operation from the central countries. It aims 
to realize old aspirations of the region for suitable machinery 
to cope with balance-of-payments disequilibria which 
jeopardize internal development efforts and the continuity of 
national policies and to permit the necessary adjustments to 
be made smoothly, rather than abruptly, when called for by 
changes in the international scene. 
This idea will surely be a hard test for Latin America's 
political imagination and co-operation. The region must show 
its political will and capacity for co-operation and 
organization through its own mechanisms and arrangements 
for taking action. This will be a key factor in bringing the 
developed countries into this new dialogue with Latin 
America. Their participation is of vital importance since the 
economic health of Latin America is today an important 
determinant in their own progress and their struggle against 
recession. To participate actively in this process it is 
necessary to understand the nature of the region's problems, 
which are not given sufficient attention in the solutions being 
discussed today at the international level. 
Pursuant to the mandate given to it at the sixteenth 
session in respect of the Financial Safety Net, the secretariat 
prepared a document (E/CEPAL/L.120) which served as the 
basis for an expert meeting at which the draft reproduced 
below was prepared. Mr. Carlos Massad worked with the 
secretariat as consultant. The participants in the meeting 
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were Messrs. Ricardo Héctor Arriazu, Nicolás Bruck, William 
R. Cline, Sergio de la Cruz, Francisco García Palacios, 
Roberto Gavalda, Jorge González del Valle, Morris Harf, 
Gustavo Petricioli, Jorge José Ponasso, Frank Rampersad, 
Wolfgang Renner, Carlos Sanson, Jorge Sakamoto, Walter 
Sedwitz, Mario Sundfeld, and Herman Van der Loos. 
INTRODUCTION 
Latin America faces a serious problem of trade and balance-
of-payments deficits in the next few years, mainly owing to 
the drop in price of most of the raw materials it exports, the 
difficulty in maintaining high rates of growth of exports of 
manufactures in the face of a world recession and trade 
restrictions, and the rise in prices of imports due to the 
intensive inflationary process affecting both developed and 
developing economies. In addition, there are indications that 
the flow of private capital will subside and remain concen-
trated in a few countries while the flow of official bilateral 
and multilateral capital also will level off or be directed to 
the poorest countries of the world. Although there is the 
prospect that capital resources of the IDB will be substan-
tially replenished, thus permitting an expanded volume of 
development lending, over the coming years, such lending is 
for specific projects and can contribute only indirectly to the 
solution or amelioration of the expected balance-of-payments 
difficulties. 
It is difficult to say how long this period of stress, which 
affects most of the countries of the region, will last. It may 
be that after 1977 the situation will improve, as the OECD 
countries regain normal growth rates and curb inflation. On 
the other hand there is also a probability of continuing 
inflation in the industrialized countries as governments find it 
increasingly difficult to apply restrictive measures that could 
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depress employment to intolerable levels. Any upward trend 
in primary product exports is not likely to surpass the rise in 
imports of manufactures, while long-term capital flows, both 
official and private, are not expected to compensate for the 
deterioration in the current account and trade restrictions 
may well intensify. Given these possibilities it appears only 
prudent to plan for difficulties lasting beyond 1977. 
Concurrently with these difficulties, there is a tendency 
to exclude many countries of the region from the most 
important new mechanism of international financial coopera-
tion, or to assign them low priority treatment, due to the fact 
that they have a higher per capita income than countries in 
other parts of the developing world. 
The machinery for the stabilization of export earnings 
which forms part of the Lomé Convention and the proposed 
OECD Financial Support Fund are, among others, two 
recently created instruments designed to permit a more 
favourable evolution of the external sector in two groups of 
countries of importance in the world economy. Latin 
America's foreign trade is also of considerable importance in 
the world economy, especially in certain areas. For the 
United States' exports of capital goods, consumer durables 
and chemical products, for example, Latin America provides 
a market three times the size of Japan's and almost as large as 
that of the European Economic Community, while for the 
EEC's sales of the same products, Latin America is equal to 
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three-quarters of the United States market and more than 
four times Japan's. The combined exports of these goods by 
the United States, the EEC and Japan to Latin America in 
1973 amounted to 11 000 million dollars. 
Therefore, any mechanism, such as the one proposed 
here, should be regarded as a device not only benefiting the 
region as such and favouring further progress toward eco-
nomic integration, but also benefiting the world economy by 
contributing to the recovery of income and employment 
levels in the countries for which Latin America is an impor-
tant market. Thus, it is desirable to create the necessary 
conditions to prevent a contraction of external demand on 
the part of the Latin American economies, pending the 
achievement of an orderly adjustment to the new conditions. 
For this purpose, mechanisms are needed to ride out the 
transition period until any necessary changes are introduced 
in the foreign trade of the Latin American countries. 
Resolution 348(XVI) adopted at the sixteenth session 
of ECLA held recently in Port of Spain recommends the 
secretariat of the Commission to convene a meeting of a 
group of experts to seek possible solutions to the balance of 
payments problems of the countries of the region. In the 
same resolution, special attention is given to exploring the 
possibility of establishing a financial safety net for Latin 
America. 
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The features of this safety net depend, of course, on the 
nature of the problem it is intended to solve. At the same 
time, however, its establishment must be a reflection of Latin 
American solidarity and of its political will to deal with its 
own problems without excessive dependence on other 
countries or regions. In this connexion what is envisaged in 
the present proposal is an essentially Latin American mecha-
nism to which other countries may adhere as associates. And 
while the creation of the system should not be dependent on 
the adherence of other countries, effectiveness demands that 
it should not be closed nor exclusively regional. 
Apart from these considerations, the safety net is in-
tended to avoid adjustments in the balance of payments 
through (i) a proliferation and intensification of import 
restrictions which would contribute to a contraction of world 
trade and seriously slow economic integration and (ii) de-
pressing domestic growth levels to intolerable levels, with the 
social and political consequences such a course might entail. 
While in the final analysis every country must make 
hard domestic adjustments if there are longer-term structural 
forces which generate chronic balance of payments strains, 
the intent of the present scheme is to provide a breathing 
space during which externally generated pressures of a hope-
fully temporary nature can be alleviated, provided of course 
that each country pursues at the same time internal policies 
that are not incompatible with the restoration of external 
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equilibrium. The focus essentially, therefore, is to sustain 
import capacity and preserve credit worthiness at a time 
when externally-generated difficulties operate in the opposite 
direction. The system would not be primarily aimed at 
dealing with domestic economic policies, although such 
aspects would inevitably have to be considered when inappro-
priate domestic policies clearly nullified the effectiveness of 
the assistance provided through the Safety Net System, 
for otherwise there would be a waste of the system's resources 
which would not be acceptable to other participants. 
In order to fulfill its role of facilitating the process of 
adjustment in the face of particularly difficult conditions, the 
system must constitute a source of financing additional to 
those existing at present, it must be distinct from existing 
development lending facilities, and its existence should not 
mean a reduction in the financing obtainable from other 
sources. 
To ensure this, the safety net should be in principle, an 
instrument of last resort. In other words, the countries could 
have recourse to it only after having used up to a reasonable 
extent and on acceptable terms such existing sources of 
balance-of-payments financing as the international financial 
markets and international organizations. 
With this aim in view, the system's loans generally 
should be granted on commercial terms, although concession-
ary terms should not be excluded if resources for them exist. 
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So as to ensure that the regional co-operation effort will 
produce the desired results, the safety net should provide 
resources subject to a decreasing automaticity. This should 
take into account the general economic circumstances, those 
of the applicant country in particular, and the most appro-
priate policies to follow in order to help prevent any undesir-
able deterioration in the rate of growth of the member 
countries and of the international community, within a 
context of increasing financial stability. 
Those countries which may decide to help finance the 
safety net should not be required to provide the resources 
they have pledged unless drawings by a member country have 
to be directly financed. Thus, the system is conceived as a 
group of commitments, to be fulfilled only when financing is 
necessary. The total amount of the commitments would 
operate on a revolving basis, so that additional commitments 
would not be required every year. The total volume of the 
commitments must be decided with a view to forming a 
sufficient stock to fulfill the objectives envisaged. 
Since the international economic conditions are causing 
generalized problems in the region, contributions from out-
side the region are now indispensable. As the situation 
becomes more normal, however, such contributions could 
gradually be reduced. In the long term, the region should 
seek to make greater use of the traditional sources of balance-
of-payments financing. The system should be self-supporting 
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if the idea is to make it a more permanent instrument. In any 
case, its characteristics and the need for its existence would 
have to be reviewed periodically. 
The operation of the safety net should not require any 
new institutions. It should be envisaged in such a way that its 
operation can be handled by an existing institution, or by 
means of co-operation arrangements among some of them. 
To sum up, the main features of the safety net that have 
been envisaged are its charater of an additional instrument, 
its character of an instrument of last resort, the generally 
commercial terms of its loans, and their decreasing automat-
icity. The system has been conceived as a set of commitments 
which will not increase, with contributions from outside the 
region at first, and there will not be any need to establish 
new institutions. 
The system would be made up of member countries and 
associate countries. The member countries would be those 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean which might 
wish to join the system. The associate countries would be 
those countries from outside the region which contribute 
resources to finance the operations of the system, on terms 
to be determined. Both member countries and associate 
countries would be termed participating countries. Those 
organizations helping to finance the operations of the system, 




The objective of the safety net is to provide the countries of 
the region with additional external balance-of-payments 
financing through mutual co-operation and the collaboration 
of agencies and countries outside the region. In particular, 
the safety net would aim at ensuring a smoother adjustment 
vis-à-vis balance-of-payments fluctuations, while maintaining 
the dynamism of the economy during the process of adjust-
ment. To achieve this, the safety net would minimize, the 
need for reversible conjunctural measures and would facili-
tate changes in economic policies and structures designed to 
ensure a more balanced development of external trade by the 
countries of the region. The operation of the system would 
take into account the need to defend, back up and promote 
the progress made in Latin America in the field of economic 
integration. Adherence to this system would involve a com-
mitment, in principle, to avoid using restrictive trade or 
international payments measures. 
2. General concept 
The safety net (system) would operate by means of commit-
ments by the governments (central banks) of the region to 
provide the system with an agreed amount of resources for 
established periods (credits). When a member country of the 
system fulfilled the requirements established for obtaining 
financial support, the executive body of the system would 
determine the manner of financing such support, either by 
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sharing out the total cost of drawings among the non-
applicant member countries, the associate countries and the 
contributing organizations in proportion to the contributions 
pledged by each in the available total, or by issuing securities 
for sale on international markets with the collective guaran-
tee of all the participants in proportion to their quotas. The 
system would thus be open to resources coming from institu-
tions, countries or markets outside the region. 
3. Operation 
The system would operate in principle as an instrument to be 
used as a last resort, after the applicant country had made 
reasonable use of its own reserves and of other sources of 
financing such as international markets and organizations. It 
would not be required that the country should have 
exhausted such sources. The executive body would decide in 
each case. All operations of the system would be expressed in 
terms of Special Drawing Rights. 
The system would be established for an initial period of 
five years. At the end of the fourth year, its operation would 
be examined and it would be decided whether or not it 
should continue to operate, and if so on what terms. 
4. Contribution of member countries in 
accordance with their quotas 
Each member country's contribution to the system would be 
determined in the form of quotas established on the basis of 
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a group of quantifiable variables. A country could voluntarily 
increase its contribution, provided such an increase were 
approved by the governing body of the system. The quotas 
would also serve to distribute the participating countries' 
financial rights and obligations and to graduate the automatic-
ity of the loans. The quota-based system of voting would be 
defined in such a way as to take account of equity and the 
effective participation of all member countries. The quotas of 
the associate countries would be determined in the light of 
their contributions, and the quota and voting system would 
be so designed as to permit the participation of the associate 
countries in the taking of decisions without adversely 
affecting the Latin American character of the scheme. 
5. Forms of financing the loans granted 
by the system 
The safety net would finance the drawings either by distribut-
ing them among the non-applicant countries in proportion 
to their quotas, or by directly placing securities on the 
international markets. The contribution of the. debtor 
countries of the system to the financing of the drawings 
would be determined by the executive body. Countries could 
voluntarily authorize bigger drawings against their credits 
than the amounts for which they were actually liable. 
If drawings were financed by distributing them among 
the countries, the individual contributing countries could 
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choose the most suitable method of financing their contri-
bution, including: 
(a) Direct financing in convertible currencies or in 
SDRs. Contributing countries could pay their contri-
bution in national currency if they were prepared to 
guarantee its automatic conversion without cost to 
any other currencies which the applicant country 
might require. In any case, the executive body of the 
system would periodically determine which curren-
cies would be considered to be convertible for the 
purposes of the system. 
(b) Providing their individual guarantee for securities so 
that the system could obtain resources on the inter-
national markets. If, for any reason, method (b) did 
not permit the pledged resources to be raised within 
a reasonable period of time and on reasonable terms, 
the country would have to use method (a) until such 
time as the difficulties preventing the effective use 
of method (b) were solved. 
(c) Authorizing the system to sell securities on their 
financial market, with their individual guarantee. In 
this case, the member would undertake to convert 
the resources obtained in its own currency into 
actually convertible currencies or SDRs, and to 
make good any. deficiency in terms of time, cost, 
etc., by means of method (a). 
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If drawings were financed by placing securities issued by 
the system on the international markets, this would be 
carried out with the collective guarantee of all the member 
countries, in proportion to their quotas. All guarantees given 
by the system would be considered to be valid until such 
time as the commitment guaranteed was paid off. The system 
could also grant guarantees to countries so that they could 
obtain financing on the international markets. 
6. Characteristics of loans granted 
The interest charged to debtors would be related to the cost 
of obtaining the resources and the yield that could otherwise 
have been obtained from the resources contributed. The 
maturity periods would be not longer than five years, renew-
able up to an additional three years in absolutely exceptional 
cases subject to the unanimous approval of the members of 
the executive body of the system. Repayments would in 
principle be in the form of six-monthly instalments, and, 
depending on the circumstances, grace periods of up to three 
years could be considered. The system could also envisage 
earlier repayments when the debtor's economic situation and 
the needs of the system so warranted. 
The use of the system's resources would be subject to a 
decreasing degree of automaticity, governed by the relation 
between the amount of resources drawn from the system and 
the user's quota. The bigger a loan was with respect to the 
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quota, the fuller would be the consultations and studies 
needed and the more specific would be the conditions to be 
satisfied in order to draw successive portions of the loan 
granted. 
Generally speaking, the system would not grant conces-
sionary credits. In the event of there being concessionary 
resources available, however, the system could consider 
granting loans on such terms to countries whose economic 
situation justified them. 
There would be, a ceiling on drawings, related to the 
user's quota. This ceiling could be exceeded in special cases 
with the unanimous approval of the members of the execu-
tive body of the system. 
The system would include a guarantee that the value of 
the resources contributed would be maintained constant, in a 
manner to be determined by the governing body. 
7. Institutionality of the system 
The institutionality of the system should be so designed as to 
facilitate the achievement of its objectives. In particular, it 
should provide an adequate guarantee to contributors, both 
from within the region and outside of it, in order to attract a 
substantial volume of contributions. The decision-making 
machinery should be such as to guarantee the application of 
the principles laid down in section 4. Efforts would be made 
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to avoid the creation of new institutions for the operation of 
the system, by using such an existing financial institution as 
could ensure its proper operation, including the minimum 
operational facilities and staff required. 
The governing body of the system would be a Board of 
Governors. There would also be an executive committee 
appointed to ensure both representativity and prompt action. 
The legal aspects of the system will be studied at the 
technical level in due course. 
8. Scope of the system 
Possible users of the system would include countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean which might wish to adhere to it. 
In any case, the system would not enter into operation until 
half the countries of the area, representing at least two-thirds 
of the total quotas programmed for the area, had formalised 
their adherence. 
Those countries which were members of sub-regional 
integration agreements could, if they wished, join the system 
as a group. They would then have to designate the country or 
institution which would represent them in their relations 
with the system. In all cases, however, the need criterion and 
conditionality would be applicable to each individual 
country. 
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Contributors to the system could include countries and 
organizations desiring to contribute on such terms as the 
system may lay down and subject to its approval. The system 
would seek to obtain the support of countries and organiza-
tions from outside the region. 
9. Size of the system 
The sum of the 1974 current account deficits of the coun-
tries of the region amounted to some 13 000 million dollars, 
and this figure is expected to increase in 1975 and 1976. The 
sum of the overall deficits of the countries, in contrast, came 
to a little less than 1 600 million dollars thanks to move-
ments of medium-term and long-term capital. If it is right to 
assume that the latter cannot be expected to improve subs-
tantially, then it is likely that the sum of the overall deficits 
will tend to increase in the years ahead. 
In order to finance three years' overall deficits some 
5 000 million dollars would be required, while some 3 000 
million dollars would be required to finance two years' defi-
cits. The system should be capable of providing the resources 
needed in order to make a substantial contribution to fi-
nancing the overall deficits not covered by existing machin-
ery. 
The total size of the system would be financed from 
both regional resources and resources coming from outside 
the region. The competitive remuneration of these resources 
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could open up possibilities for obtaining financing from out-
side the region on a substantial scale. 
In any case, the adherence of a member, country or 
institution to the system would not mean the immediate use 
by the latter of all the resources pledged. Use of the resources 
pledged could take place gradually with the passage of time. 
